Appendix

THE IRISH COMMAND IN 1914

Major General in charge of Administration

Major General L. B. Friend

General Officer Commanding, Parkgate, Dublin

Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Paget

General Staff

BGGS Brigadier General G. T. Forestier Walker

Administrative, technical and departmental staff

3rd Cavalry Brigade, Curragh

Brigadier General H. P. Gough

5th Division, Curragh

Major General Sir Charles Fergusson

14th Infantry Brigade, Curragh

Brigadier General S. P. Rolt

2 Suffolks

1 East Surreys (Dublin)

1 DCLI

2 Manchesters

15th Infantry Brigade, Belfast

Brigadier General Count Gleichen

1 Norfolks (Holywood)

1 Beds (Mullingar)

1 Cheshire (Londonderry)

I Dorsets (Belfast)

Divisional Artillery

Brigadier General J. E. W. Headlam

Divisional Engineers

6th Division, Cork

Major General W. P. Pulteney

16th Infantry Brigade, Fermoy

Brigadier General E. C. Ingouville-Williams

1 East Kent (Fermoy)

1 Leicesters (Fermoy)

1 SLI (Tipperary)

2 York and Lancaster (Limerick)

17th Infantry Brigade, Cork

Brigadier General W. R. B. Doran

1 Royal Fusiliers (Kinsale)

1 North Staffs (Buttevant)

2 Leinsters (Cork)

3 Rifle Brigade (Cork)

Divisional Artillery, Mallow

Brigadier General W. L. H. Paget

Defended Ports

North Irish Coastal Defences – Lough Swilly and Belfast

South Irish Coastal Defences – Queenstown Harbour and Berehaven

No. 11 District

Colonel F. F. Hill

No. 12 District

Colonel S. W. Scrace-Dickins

A QUESTION OF DUTY

A Question Of Duty

The Curragh Incident 1914

Paul O’Brien

A QUESTION OF DUTY

First published 2014

by New Island

2 Brookside

Dundrum Road

Dublin 14

www.newisland.ie

Copyright © Paul O’Brien, 2014

Paul O’Brien has asserted his moral rights.

PRINT ISBN: 978-1-84840-314-7

EPUB ISBN: 978-1-84840-315-4

MOBI ISBN: 978-1-84840-316-1

All rights reserved. The material in this publication is protected by copyright law. Except as may be permitted by law, no part of the material may be reproduced (including by storage in a retrieval system) or transmitted in any form or by any means; adapted; rented or lent without the written permission of the copyright owner.

British Library Cataloguing Data. A CIP catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Chapter 1

Beware the Ides of March

20 MARCH 1914, MORNING

At 09.30 hours on Friday, 20 March 1914, six British army officers walked briskly through the corridors of Army Headquarters in Parkgate Street, Dublin. The officers were part of the Irish Command from the Curragh Army Camp in County Kildare. They had been summoned to Dublin to attend a meeting with Lieutenant General Sir Arthur Paget, general officer commanding the forces in Ireland. As they made their way to the Lieutenant General’s office, their footsteps loud on the wooden floors, they ignored the many oil paintings of past commanders that adorned the walls.

Major General Sir Charles Fergusson and his fellow officers Brigadier General S. P. Rolt and Brigadier General Hubert Gough had arrived in Dublin via the 08.15 train from Kildare. Brigadier General G. J. Cuthbert was already waiting for his colleagues along with Major General L. B. Friend and Colonel Hill.

Once the officers entered the Lieutenant General’s office, their eyes wandered over the odds and ends of furniture which were littered with paperwork. Over the fireplace hung a portrait of King George V in military uniform.

Lieutenant General Paget strode into the room. The officers thought that his manner was in accordance with his uniform: he was stern and pompous and smoking a cigar. Before the meeting commenced he ordered that no notes were to be taken, a request that surprised all those in attendance.

He announced that ‘active operations are about to commence against Ulster.’ ‘I am not expecting any bloodshed,’ he said. ‘We are too strong.’ He continued: ‘The Fleet is in Belfast Harbour and some ships are also in Dublin Bay.’9 Looking at Brigadier General Gough, Paget exclaimed, ‘You need expect no mercy from your old friend in the War Office’, by whom he meant Field Marshal Sir John French. Gough was incensed that he had been picked out and threatened.

Paget stated that he had received the following concessions from the War Office in London and that these were final and that no officer should seek assistance from any old friends in the War Office.

Officers actually domiciled in Ulster would be exempted from taking part in any operation that might take place. They would be permitted to ‘disappear’ (that being the exact phrase used by the War Office) and when all was over would be allowed to resume their places without their careers or positions being affected.

Officers who stated they were unwilling to serve might tender their resignations, but these could not be accepted. Officers doing so would be dismissed from the service.

The phrase ‘domiciled in Ulster’ was to be strictly interpreted as those who actually had their homes within the province. Paget stated that all brigadiers were responsible, under penalty of court martial, to verify the genuineness of any applications submitted by those who were not taking part in operations.

He also stated that any officer who was not willing to take part in this operation must come to a decision and, to that end, they were not to attend any other conferences that day. Paget also ordered that a squadron of cavalry from Dublin was to be held in readiness to march northwards the following day.

The six generals and one colonel sat for a few moments in uncomfortable silence. The atmosphere was tense.

Paget asked if any of the officers had any remarks to make. Gough was the first to speak. He asked if the concession of ‘disappearance’ could be granted to all Irish officers. Even though he could not claim exemption as a resident of Ulster, Gough stated that he was born in Ireland and would have difficulty taking up arms against Ulster Unionists, many of whom were personal friends. He also asked how the ‘disappearance’ of officers was to be arranged. Tapping on the table with a pencil to emphasise his words, Paget stated that Gough could not claim exemption and that he must consider his position seriously. He did not answer Gough’s second question.

As the meeting broke up Paget reiterated his former warning to Gough: ‘You can expect no help from the other side.’ Four quick strides took Paget to the door and with a swift movement he threw it open. As the officers filed out the door, Paget said, ‘Tell your officers to trust me and there will be no bloodshed.’

As the officers assembled outside, Major General Fergusson suggested that they should discuss the ultimatum that had been put to them and that the ‘the army must hold together.’ Rolt and Cuthbert agreed with their commander but Gough, unable to find the words to frame the protest that rose to his lips, declared bluntly that he would not go. He was incensed that he was singled out when Paget said that he could ‘expect no help from his friends at the War Office’.

The party broke up and the officers left the building. Gough walked briskly from HQ to Marlborough Barracks, where the 5th Lancers were billeted. Before he entered the barracks he stopped at a telegraph office and sent a wire to his brother, John Gough, who was Chief Staff Officer to General Douglas Haig at Aldershot, England. The message read: ‘The alternative of marching against Ulster or resigning from the Service [has] just been offered me by Paget. Am accepting second alternative. Do you think I am right?’

On entering Marlborough Barracks he sought Lieutenant Colonel Parker, who had been recently promoted to the command of the 5th Lancers. Parker’s reaction to the news was one of indignation. The two officers headed to the officers’ mess where they managed to assemble fifteen officers, three quarters of those on duty. Here Gough laid Paget’s ultimatum before them, giving them two hours to reach a decision. Within those two hours, the seventeen officers, including the Colonel, decided to accept dismissal from the army rather than take part in active operations against Ulster.

Meanwhile, Fergusson, having left the meeting with Paget earlier in the day, was required to remain in Dublin that afternoon to attend another meeting and used this opportunity to draft a document that he could issue to his unit commanders:

In view of the possibility of active operations in Ulster, the War Office has authorized the following communication to officers:

Officers whose homes are actually in the province of Ulster who wish to do so may apply for permission to be absent from duty during the period of operations, and will be allowed to ‘disappear’ from Ireland. Such officers will, subsequently, be reinstated, and will suffer no loss in their career.

Any other officer who from conscientious or other motives is not prepared to carry out his duty as ordered, should say so at once. Such officers will at once be dismissed from the service.

As regards (1), the words underlined are to be taken literally and strictly, and Brigadiers and O.C. Units are responsible [under penalty of Court Martial] that only such officers as come under that description are allowed to forward applications to ‘disappear’.

As regards (2), it is hoped that very few cases will be found of officers who elect to sever their connection with the service. All decisions must be made at once, and application forwarded to Headquarters 5th Division by this evening if possible.

Charles Fergusson, Major-Genl.

Commanding 5th Division and troops Curragh10

Parkgate, Dublin
20th March 1914

Summoning his aide-de-camp, Fergusson gave him the written order and told him in a few words ‘what was in the wind’. He was to take the order to the Curragh Camp and issue it to the unit commanders.

In England, Gough’s brother John, having received the telegram, contacted the Director of Military Operations Major General Sir Henry Wilson in relation to the escalating situation in Dublin and Kildare. Wilson’s immediate response was to counsel calm and with much difficulty persuaded Gough ‘not to send in his papers till tomorrow when we must find out if this is all true’. ‘We must,’ he wrote, ‘steady ourselves a bit’.11 While Wilson counselled the Gough brothers, he realised that the unfolding situation in Ireland could provide a window of opportunity for the right person, an opportunity to cause dissention amongst the ranks of the government and the army.

The irons were in the fire.

Chapter 2

Decisions, Decisions

20 MARCH 1914, AFTERNOON

For centuries, thousands of British troops had been stationed throughout every province in Ireland. In the aftermath of the Act of Union, the threat of foreign invasion, sedition and agrarian unrest continually posed problems for the British administration at Dublin Castle. In 1831 Lord Anglesey stated: ‘It is idle and absurd to shut your eyes to the degrading fact. We have positively nothing to look to [in Ireland] but the army.’12

One of the first purpose-built barracks in the world was the Royal Barracks in Dublin, which was constructed along the quays of the River Liffey in 1701. This military compound housed infantry and cavalry and was to continually expand in order to house thousands of troops that were needed to garrison the country. The Anglo-French Wars from 1792 to 1815 led to the widespread construction of military barracks throughout England, Scotland, Wales and Ireland. In order to secure Ireland and accommodate potential recruits, the construction of military barracks increased throughout the island and the country was divided into four military districts, each with its own general staff. At this time it was estimated that there were 126,000 troops stationed in Ireland, of whom 46,000 were regulars (cavalry, infantry and artillery), 27,000 militia and 53,000 yeomanry. Battalions were rotated every three years in and out of the country with a central reserve being stationed at Athlone.

During the early nineteenth century numerous training exercises were organised 50km from Dublin City on the plains of the Curragh in County Kildare. The Curragh plains were ideal for exercising men, horses and guns. Thousands of soldiers took part in manoeuvres on the 4,870 acres of grassland, often living under canvas or billeted in specially constructed wooden huts.

It was during the Crimean War (1854–1856) that the idea for a permanent training camp located on the Curragh plains was put forward. Lieutenant Colonel Henry Lugard, Assistant General of the Royal Engineers, states that the Curragh provided a ‘means of accommodating a large force of infantry for the purpose of being trained and manoeuvred in conjunction with Cavalry and Artillery…’.13

At Army Headquarters in Dublin, Paget received a telegram from the War Office stating that General Macready, the officer who was to take charge of the situation in Ulster, was recovering from a bout of malaria.

Sir N. Macready is better, but cannot cross before Sunday.

It will be essential for you to arrange that some officer represents him for the moment as Birrel has issued instructions to Commissioner of Police, Belfast, to take instructions from officer appointed General Officer Commanding there. Wire name of officers appointed temporarily as soon as possible.

You should apply to Great Northern Railway for facilities for transport of troops and let me know their reply to-day. This may give rise to important legal questions.

The commanding officers of two cruisers now at Kingstown will report to you. Inform Admiralty as soon as possible if battalion intended for Dundalk goes by rail or by sea.

Destroyer ‘Firedrake’ last night left Portland for Kingstown to be at your disposal.

You may think it right to take special measures for the comfort of your troops owing to the rough weather.

Any necessary additional expenditure is authorized by this telegram.

Report generally on the situation by wire this afternoon.14

After the meeting at HQ with Paget, Brigadier General S. P. Rolt travelled by motor car to the Curragh and outlined the ultimatum to his battalion commanders. The Colonels dispersed and summoned their junior officers in order to relay the information they had just received. One officer wrote later: ‘Everyone objects to going and nine out of ten refuse under any conditions to go.’ Cuthbert’s battalions had news of events before noon.

Having finished in Marlborough Barracks, Brigadier General Gough travelled to the Curragh Camp, where he arrived at 15.30 hours. He immediately ordered that all remaining officers of the 16th Lancers, the 4th Hussars, the Horse Artillery, the D and E Batteries under Colonel Breeks, and the Royal Engineers assemble in the officers’ mess in Ponsonby Barrracks. Gough laid the ultimatum before his officers and told them each man must decide for himself. He also told them that they had the option of dismissal. He requested that they decide by 17.30 hours. Second Lieutenant W. Scott-Watson wrote to his father:

This evening I and the other officers of our regiment were called upon to make the most momentous decision of our lives. We were all assembled in the Colonel’s office, and he read out the following proclamation from the War Office:

In view of the possible active operations in Ulster, all officers domiciled in Ulster will be allowed to disappear from Ireland till the operations are over. Any officer who, from conscientious reasons, refuses to take part in these operations will send in an application by 10 a.m. tomorrow. Any officer doing so will be dismissed from the Service.

This we all agreed is the greatest outrage that has ever been perpetrated on the Service. We have had to make this decision without any opportunity of discussing it with our people.

The words ‘domiciled in Ulster’ have been underlined, and under penalty of court-martial our Colonel has to state whether a man is domiciled in Ulster or not.

I had hardly time to wire for your opinion, so I have decided to carry on. Seven in my Brigade have decided to refuse, and will probably be dismissed [from] the Service either tomorrow or very shortly.

I have decided to stay for the following reasons:

Although, as you know, my sympathies are absolutely with Ulster, I think that at a time like this the army must stick together. If we once start to disintegrate the Service, then goodbye to the Empire and anything else that matters.

Moreover, in case of strike duty, the men whose sympathies are fairly obviously with the strikers have to carry on and do their duty, so that now it is up to us to do the same.

I hope and pray that I have done the right thing, but anyway it is now too late for anything else, for if you don’t avail yourself of this opportunity of quitting, and then later on you want to do so, it means a court-martial, with a possibility of being shot.

Altogether, it is the most diabolically ingenious thing that has ever been brought in. What we especially detest is being dismissed and not allowed to resign.15

However, before the meeting broke up, all except two had opted for dismissal.

Paget heard about Gough’s visit to Marlborough Barracks and immediately sought Colonel Parker. A heated argument ensued between the two officers in relation to Gough’s visit and the result of the ultimatum that Gough had laid before the men. Demanding that the 5th Lancers should reconsider their decisions, Paget repeated that, without the army, ‘Ulster would be in a blaze on Saturday.’ He appealed to Parker stating ‘that his men might proceed to Ulster and chuck it in when the fighting began’. Shocked, Parker replied: ‘That would be deserting our men!’ On leaving the barracks, Paget ordered Parker to reconsider and report to him the following morning. He sent a telegram to the War Office, stating:

Officer commanding the 5th Lancers states that all officers except two, and one doubtful, are resigning their commissions to-day. I much fear same condition in the 16th Lancers. Fear men will refuse to move.16

As events were unfolding in Dublin and the Curragh Camp, senior British army commander Field Marshal Lord Roberts wrote an urgent letter of warning from his desk at the War Office in London to Prime Minister H. H. A. Asquith:

I am unwilling to trouble you with a letter at a time of great political tension, and I certainly would not do so were it not that the matter about which I desire to write to you is one of such vital urgency as to impel me to bring it to your notice without further delay.

The statements made by yourself and your colleagues in Parliament and elsewhere show clearly that you contemplate using the forces of the Crown for the purpose of compelling the Ulster Unionists to submit to Home Rule. Having an intimate knowledge of the Army and being in close touch with British officers in all parts of the Empire, I have no hesitation in telling you that any attempt of this kind would place an intolerable strain on the discipline of the Army, and would produce within it a state of demoralisation from which it would, in my opinion, never recover.

It is certain that Civil War, or, as you call it, ‘Civil Commotion’, cannot be confined to Ulster, nor to Ireland, nor to Great Britain. It is also certain we shall have outbreaks of violence in many of our large towns. The effect in India, where the present conditions are full of anxiety, may be incalculable, and it is at least conceivable that some European power might take advantage of our domestic difficulties to say insulting things, or even to push inadmissible claims at a moment when we should be powerless to resist them.

The officers and men of the Army are under no misapprehension as to the gravity of the situation. [T]hey are amongst the most loyal and law-abiding of any of His Majesty’s subjects, but they are also intelligent men, and they realise to the full that, no matter under what legal guise the order may be given to them, they may be asked to shoot down fellow countrymen who, like themselves, would be fighting under the Union Jack, and also, like themselves, would go to their death singing ‘God Save the King’. And, please remember, as our soldiers will remember, that all this will seem to them to be done at the bidding of men who have never missed an opportunity of slandering and vilifying the Army in the grossest manner.

The officers and men of the Army are not politicians, and never concern themselves with the fate of parties, and this very fact prevents their minds being obscured by Party cries and party tactics, and allows them to see the true state of affairs.

So certain am I of what will happen should you make this demand upon the Army, that I entreat you to pause before taking so fatal a step.17

If the disenchantment that was evident in the Curragh Camp was allowed to spread, Paget knew that military camps throughout Ireland and England would be in danger of following suit. Years had been spent reforming the armed forces and the Curragh Army Camp in County Kildare was one of the most important training camps in Europe.

Construction of this permanent training camp had commenced in 1855 and it comprised of 10 barrack buildings that could each accommodate 1,000 soldiers. Purpose-built quarters for officers were erected and within a short period of time the facilities were increased in order to billet over 10,000 soldiers. Military engineers designed a camp that incorporated buildings such as a post office, a fire station, two churches, a water pumping station, a clock tower and a courthouse. A new road network linked the camp with a series of rifle ranges and training grounds. The roads also connected the camp to military administrative areas at Newbridge, located two miles to the north-east of the Curragh’s edge and six miles from Kildare town. Rail links were also utilised as the Great Southern and Western Railway ran from Dublin to Cork and at the north-west of the Curragh there was a short spur line or siding used for the entraining of troops.

In the years that followed, the Curragh was recognised as one of the best equipped training grounds in the British Isles. Barracks constructed of red brick soon replaced the original wooden barrack buildings.

In 1881 Joseph Chamberlain stated, ‘The [English] system in Ireland is founded on the bayonets of 30,000 soldiers encamped permanently in a hostile country.’18 By the end of the nineteenth century the Curragh Camp had become a divisional headquarters.