Details
The Samurai preparing for the Dragon´s Attack? Normative Drivers and Strategic Foundations of Japan´s Security Cooperation with Australia and the United States
1. Auflage
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34,99 € |
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| Verlag: | Anchor Academic Publishing |
| Format: | |
| Veröffentl.: | 01.02.2014 |
| ISBN/EAN: | 9783954895717 |
| Sprache: | englisch |
| Anzahl Seiten: | 90 |
Dieses eBook enthält ein Wasserzeichen.
Beschreibungen
The book offers an exploration and analysis of the ideational motives which drove the establishment of the ‘Trilateral Strategic Dialogue’ (TSD), a milestone defense framework that was concluded between Japan, Australia and the United States, in March 2006.
Among realists the TSD was quickly identified as power-balancing of the three countries to counter a rising China. However, non-material reasons to establish a common forum for security cooperation are evident. Not only are the three allies democracies, but Japan, and especially Australia look back on decade-old alliances with the United States.
Utilizing a constructivist approach, the author argues that the establishment of the TSD can be accounted for by a strongly perceived collective identity between the leaders of the three countries, constituted by shared norms and democratic values.
The book sheds light on the normative drivers of the process, and assesses the impact of values by which the leaders of Japan, Australia and the United States mutually connected. It explains the normative mechanisms which led to a security relationship that would grow to unprecedented levels of intimacy.
The book highlights the goals and objectives of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and further, explains why South Korea, a democracy and ally of the United States, is not added to the framework. Moreover, the book outlines the role of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue as one step in the greater strategy of the three governments to establish a community of democratic states in the Asia-Pacific.
Among realists the TSD was quickly identified as power-balancing of the three countries to counter a rising China. However, non-material reasons to establish a common forum for security cooperation are evident. Not only are the three allies democracies, but Japan, and especially Australia look back on decade-old alliances with the United States.
Utilizing a constructivist approach, the author argues that the establishment of the TSD can be accounted for by a strongly perceived collective identity between the leaders of the three countries, constituted by shared norms and democratic values.
The book sheds light on the normative drivers of the process, and assesses the impact of values by which the leaders of Japan, Australia and the United States mutually connected. It explains the normative mechanisms which led to a security relationship that would grow to unprecedented levels of intimacy.
The book highlights the goals and objectives of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and further, explains why South Korea, a democracy and ally of the United States, is not added to the framework. Moreover, the book outlines the role of the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue as one step in the greater strategy of the three governments to establish a community of democratic states in the Asia-Pacific.
Hauke Klevinghaus studied at the University of Dokkyo (Tokyo) and the University of Duisburg-Essen, and holds a degree in East Asian studies. His research focuses on Japanese security policy, Japanese history and international relations in the Asia-Pacific. He is currently a PhD candidate at the University's International Graduate School of Oriental and Asian Studies, in Bonn.
Text Sample:
Chapter 2.1.3.2, Cooperation in Iraq:
Next to these strong normative ties that had connected the governments in Japan and Australia, another norm should emerge that would further bind the two countries together: comradeship.
Tokyo had already supported Australian peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (1993-1994) and East Timor (since 2002). In Cambodia, Japanese troops served under Australian command and since then, unit-level cooperation had become a central feature of bilateral cooperation. In East-Timor, Australia and Japan provided the largest number of troops under the UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) banner. As a result, Canberra gave diplomatic support to Tokyo´s efforts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in return for Japan´s contribution in East Timor. Cooperation proceeded well and both sides consulted each other on their assessments of roles. As such, both sides had perceived the East Timor case as an example of successful cooperation. Collaboration in Iraq however, marked a significant step in the positive development of Japan-Australia relations. In February 2005, Canberra, following a formal request from Tokyo, acted altruistic and sent 450 ADF personnel to Iraq with the sole purpose of guarding troops of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) that engaged in reconstruction work. The dispatch was irrationally costly for Australia with expenditures of close to A$200 million. This number is absurdly high when compared to the total of about A$270 million for all ADF activities in Iraq in that year. In an Interview with NHK John Howard justified the dispatch to make sure that the Japanese stayed in Iraq and that the Australia-Japan security relationship was strengthened. He refused any official compensation by the Japanese government: 'There are no trade offs, (…) in no way did I say to the Japanese Government that if we do this will you do something else, it’s not like that'.
Military personnel working in a war-like area in a third country requires a much closer and personal level of contacts. With the theater in Iraq, cooperation had shifted from PKO´s to an actual warzone. The commitment of troops to protect the SDF personnel was thus cooperation of a 'much higher order' and made possible the 'greatest transformation in Australian attitudes towards Japan'. When the Australian PM visited Japan in 2005, he thus emphasized that 'Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan' and considered Japanese-Australian security relations to be on a new level. He considered cooperation between the militaries in Iraq as 'further evidence of the very close relationship' between the two countries and highlighted that 'We are two great Pacific democracies and we have a lot in common and it is therefore appropriate that we take this position'.
Increased consultation and cooperation over the last two years had preceded these statements. Shortly after Howard´s 2003 Japan visit both governments signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Exchanges between the Japan Defense Agency and the Australian Department of Defence' in Tokyo. With the paper, both sides increased cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation. It is noteworthy that at this time, Australian defense ministers and defense force chiefs would coordinate their security postures with Japan, 'where appropriate'. However after the meeting, bilateral military exercises would be regularized and Australian-Japanese security consultations with the United States would be upgraded.
Military cooperation in Iraq was crucial for Australian-Japanese identification and a normative driver of two countries security relations that had already worked together militarily in PKO in East Timor and Cambodia.
'In East Timor and not to mention in Iraq, close beside us we have always found Australians. (…) I am certain that we can work similarly together in the future (…) by making this experience Japan and Australia together had in Iraq a model'.
This was later emphasized by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer who perceived mutual cooperation in Iraq as a 'clear demonstration of the growing strategic relationship and more broadly our ever-deepening bilateral relationship.' More importantly for him however was, that this security cooperation 'was a manifestation of what really binds our two countries closely together. (…) We were there because we value freedom. We are liberal, market-based democracies. We know freedom and believe it is worth promoting'.
2.1.3.3, 2006 Developments:
Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shiozaki Yasuhisa identified 'an undercurrent desire' between the two countries to broaden the relationship beyond a 'natural' economic partnership that had 'never lost steam': 'Japan has no closer partner or friend in the region than Australia. I should go on to say that tightly bound by shared values, Japan and Australia together make 'Partners of Democracy along 135 degrees east longitude.' The Australian-Japanese partnership lies 'at the core of regional security' where it can play a 'pivotal role' as stabilizer not just the Asia-Pacific region 'but far beyond'.
On the same day that the TSD was concluded, Australia and Japan also strengthened their security dyad. Then Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro and his Australian counterpart, Alexander Downer placed a premium on their security cooperation in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq which they considered an 'historic joint contribution to the development of a free and democratic Iraq', emphasizing the 'highly professional manner in which their respective forces were cooperating in Al Muthanna.' Both sides strengthened their bilateral strategic dialogue and agreed for annual meetings of the Foreign Ministers, a policy dialogue at Secretary/Vice-Minister level as well as a strategic dialogue at the senior officials level. Bilateral relations were further deepened through increased coordination of aid efforts in the South Pacific and a joint move to restrict access by North Korea to financial institutions. Downer justified this move with Australia's 'strong stand against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'.
Chapter 2.1.3.2, Cooperation in Iraq:
Next to these strong normative ties that had connected the governments in Japan and Australia, another norm should emerge that would further bind the two countries together: comradeship.
Tokyo had already supported Australian peacekeeping operations in Cambodia (1993-1994) and East Timor (since 2002). In Cambodia, Japanese troops served under Australian command and since then, unit-level cooperation had become a central feature of bilateral cooperation. In East-Timor, Australia and Japan provided the largest number of troops under the UN Peace Keeping Operations (PKO) banner. As a result, Canberra gave diplomatic support to Tokyo´s efforts to gain a permanent seat on the UN Security Council in return for Japan´s contribution in East Timor. Cooperation proceeded well and both sides consulted each other on their assessments of roles. As such, both sides had perceived the East Timor case as an example of successful cooperation. Collaboration in Iraq however, marked a significant step in the positive development of Japan-Australia relations. In February 2005, Canberra, following a formal request from Tokyo, acted altruistic and sent 450 ADF personnel to Iraq with the sole purpose of guarding troops of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (JSDF) that engaged in reconstruction work. The dispatch was irrationally costly for Australia with expenditures of close to A$200 million. This number is absurdly high when compared to the total of about A$270 million for all ADF activities in Iraq in that year. In an Interview with NHK John Howard justified the dispatch to make sure that the Japanese stayed in Iraq and that the Australia-Japan security relationship was strengthened. He refused any official compensation by the Japanese government: 'There are no trade offs, (…) in no way did I say to the Japanese Government that if we do this will you do something else, it’s not like that'.
Military personnel working in a war-like area in a third country requires a much closer and personal level of contacts. With the theater in Iraq, cooperation had shifted from PKO´s to an actual warzone. The commitment of troops to protect the SDF personnel was thus cooperation of a 'much higher order' and made possible the 'greatest transformation in Australian attitudes towards Japan'. When the Australian PM visited Japan in 2005, he thus emphasized that 'Australia has no greater friend in Asia than Japan' and considered Japanese-Australian security relations to be on a new level. He considered cooperation between the militaries in Iraq as 'further evidence of the very close relationship' between the two countries and highlighted that 'We are two great Pacific democracies and we have a lot in common and it is therefore appropriate that we take this position'.
Increased consultation and cooperation over the last two years had preceded these statements. Shortly after Howard´s 2003 Japan visit both governments signed a 'Memorandum of Understanding on Defense Exchanges between the Japan Defense Agency and the Australian Department of Defence' in Tokyo. With the paper, both sides increased cooperation in areas such as counter-terrorism and counter-proliferation. It is noteworthy that at this time, Australian defense ministers and defense force chiefs would coordinate their security postures with Japan, 'where appropriate'. However after the meeting, bilateral military exercises would be regularized and Australian-Japanese security consultations with the United States would be upgraded.
Military cooperation in Iraq was crucial for Australian-Japanese identification and a normative driver of two countries security relations that had already worked together militarily in PKO in East Timor and Cambodia.
'In East Timor and not to mention in Iraq, close beside us we have always found Australians. (…) I am certain that we can work similarly together in the future (…) by making this experience Japan and Australia together had in Iraq a model'.
This was later emphasized by Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer who perceived mutual cooperation in Iraq as a 'clear demonstration of the growing strategic relationship and more broadly our ever-deepening bilateral relationship.' More importantly for him however was, that this security cooperation 'was a manifestation of what really binds our two countries closely together. (…) We were there because we value freedom. We are liberal, market-based democracies. We know freedom and believe it is worth promoting'.
2.1.3.3, 2006 Developments:
Senior Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, Shiozaki Yasuhisa identified 'an undercurrent desire' between the two countries to broaden the relationship beyond a 'natural' economic partnership that had 'never lost steam': 'Japan has no closer partner or friend in the region than Australia. I should go on to say that tightly bound by shared values, Japan and Australia together make 'Partners of Democracy along 135 degrees east longitude.' The Australian-Japanese partnership lies 'at the core of regional security' where it can play a 'pivotal role' as stabilizer not just the Asia-Pacific region 'but far beyond'.
On the same day that the TSD was concluded, Australia and Japan also strengthened their security dyad. Then Japanese Foreign Minister Aso Taro and his Australian counterpart, Alexander Downer placed a premium on their security cooperation in East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq which they considered an 'historic joint contribution to the development of a free and democratic Iraq', emphasizing the 'highly professional manner in which their respective forces were cooperating in Al Muthanna.' Both sides strengthened their bilateral strategic dialogue and agreed for annual meetings of the Foreign Ministers, a policy dialogue at Secretary/Vice-Minister level as well as a strategic dialogue at the senior officials level. Bilateral relations were further deepened through increased coordination of aid efforts in the South Pacific and a joint move to restrict access by North Korea to financial institutions. Downer justified this move with Australia's 'strong stand against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction'.
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